Citation
DeVore, Marc R. A More Complex and Conventional Victory: Revisiting the Dhofar Counterinsurgency, 1963-1975
. Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol 23, no. 1 (2012): 144-173. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2012.632861.
Findings
While it is commonly assumed that Dhofar insurgency is a model insurgency in the primary use of hearts and minds, the author challenges this. He finds support for his hypothesis that the war was won mostly through conventional means. While the British used irregular militia and engaged in development programs, these efforts were not very successful at first. Irregular militia would often not follow orders and experienced factional divisions. They would also not complete development programs they were tasked with. Instead, more emphasis on creating a barrier between rebel bases in S. Yemen and Dhofar population centers helped to cut off the rebels from the population, which ultimately hurt their progress. This approach was also combined with the British training of Mahra militia to conduct attacks on S. Yemen from Saudi Arabia. Finally, these conventional approaches benefited greatly from the growth of the Sultan's army and Iranian assistance in the fight. As oil revenue increased Oman was in a better position to conduct more conventional attacks while also continuing the civil development program. However, the author argues that it was the conventional increase in power and attacks against the rebels that proved pivotal, supplemented with the hearts and minds approach.
Tags
Lever of Power: Information Lever of Power: Military Lever of Power: Intelligence Lever of Power: Development Method: Qualitative Geoscope: Single country UN Region: Western Asia DOD Region: CENTCOM Country: Oman Actor: State Target: Consitituents Target: General Population Target: Leadership Target: Member Target: Sympathizers Type: Article Year: 2012
Research Background
- Research questions
- Was the Dhofar War really a 'textbook' counterinsurgency? (inferred)
- Hypotheses
- Conventional operations, more so than the use of local irregular militias and hearts and minds, ultimately won the Dhofar War because the rebels ceased operating as unconventional insurgents and sought to defend important facilities and regain the military initiative through conventional small unit tactics. (inferred)
Variables or Concepts
- Independent variables & concepts
- Conventional military tactics
- Dependent variables & concepts
- COIN success
Methodologies
- Qualitative method description
- Case study of Dhofar insurgency using secondary sources
Time Frame
- Start: 1963
- End: 1975