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Citation

Bastos, Marco; Farkas, Johan. 'Donald Trump Is My President!': The Internet Research Agency Propaganda Machine. Social Media + Society Vol 5, no. 3 (2019): 1-13. DOI: 10.1177/2056305119865466.

Findings

The study finds support for the first hypothesis that IRA accounts are more likely to be associated with black propaganda or disguised sources within the enemy population than other types of propaganda (gray or unidentifiable sources and white or identifiable sources). Black propaganda accounts had a higher number of followers and average number of messages posted compared with gray and white accounts. There is also support for the second hypothesis that IRA efforts to spread falsehoods and conspiracy theories are segmented across propaganda type. Specifically, gray propaganda scored consistently higher than black and white for fear mongering, populism sentiments, and hostility. The IRA seems to favor accounts with unidentifiable location and whose affiliation is concealed to disseminate fear mongering, populist appeals, and hostile political platforms, including scapegoating and call for action against threats to society. There is also support for the third hypothesis, specifically that the IRA propaganda on social media promotes agitation, emotional responses, direct behavior, polarization, and support for rumors and conspiracy theories by strategically deploying black, gray, or white propaganda. Here, the study shows that black propaganda accounts show higher scores for each of the above variables. Overall, the results from hypotheses two and three show that dissemination of fear mongering stories, stoking populism sentiments, and encouraging hostile expression is more likely associated with gray propaganda. Black propaganda, on the contrary, is central to sowing social discord in the target population. These two classes of propaganda were used to stoke fears in the public and they contrast with self-identified (white propaganda) Russian accounts that tweet mostly pro-Kremlin content. Lastly, the study shows support for the fourth hypothesis, indicating that propaganda type is predictive of strategic target of IRA campaigns. The study identified five broad campaign targets: Russian citizens, Brexit (including mainstream media coverage and support to the Brexit campaign), conservative patriots (including Republican content), protest activism (including Black Lives Matter, Anti-Trump, and Anti-Hillary communication), and local news, whose accounts post and retweet mainstream media sources. It found that gray propaganda was dedicated to local news and the Brexit campaign, black propaganda deployed across campaign targets, and white propaganda covered Russian and Ukrainian issues almost exclusively.

The study finds support for the first hypothesis that IRA accounts are more likely to be associated with black propaganda or disguised sources within the enemy population than other types of propaganda (gray or unidentifiable sources and white or identifiable sources). Black propaganda accounts had a higher number of followers, followers, and average number of messages posted compared with gray and white accounts. There is also support for the second hypothesis that IRA efforts to spread falsehoods and conspiracy theories are segmented across propaganda type. Specifically, gray propaganda scored consistently higher than black and white for fear mongering, populism sentiments, and hostility. The IRA seems to favor accounts with unidentifiable location and whose affiliation is concealed to disseminate fear mongering, populist appeals, and hostile political platforms, including scapegoating and call for action against threats to society. There is also support for the third hypothesis, specifically that the IRA propaganda on social media promotes agitation, emotional responses, direct behavior, polarization, and support for rumors and conspiracy theories by strategically deploying black, gray, or white propaganda. Here, the study shows that black propaganda accounts show higher scores for each of the above variables. Overall, the results from hypotheses two and three show that dissemination of fear mongering stories, stoking populism sentiments, and encouraging hostile expression is more likely associated with gray propaganda. Black propaganda, on the contrary, is central to sowing social discord in the target population. These two classes of propaganda were used to stoke fears in the public and they contrast with self-identified (white propaganda) Russian accounts that tweet mostly pro-Kremlin content. Lastly, the study shows support for the fourth hypothesis, indicating that propaganda type is predictive of strategic target of IRA campaigns. The study identified five broad campaign targets: Russian citizens, Brexit (including mainstream media coverage and support to the Brexit campaign), conservative patriots (including Republican content), protest activism (including Black Lives Matter, Anti-Trump, and Anti-Hillary communication), and local news, whose accounts post and retweet mainstream media sources. It found that gray propaganda was dedicated to local news and the Brexit campaign, black propaganda deployed across campaign targets, and white propaganda covered Russian and Ukrainian issues almost exclusively.

Tags

Method: Quantitative Operation: State Initiation of info ops threat/attack Attack: Political/Legal Institutions of the state that is threatened/attacked Attack: General population of the state that is threatened/attacked Geoscope: Single country UN Region: Northern America DOD Region: NORTHCOM Country: USA Type: Article Year: 2019

Research Background
  • Research questions
    1. What are the different ways in which Russia's Internet Research Agency has used black or disguised propaganda on Twitter and how does this use differ from other types of propaganda? (inferred)
  • Hypotheses
    1. The IRA-linked Twitter accounts will leverage the historical low level of trust in the media and deploy mostly black as opposed to white or gray propaganda.
    2. IRA efforts to foster confusion and stoke divisions by spreading fear mongering stories, rely on expletives and hostile expression, and disseminate populism appeals that position "the people" against the government are likely to be segmented across propaganda types.
    3. The IRA propaganda on social media promotes agitation, emotional responses, direct behavior, polarization, and support for rumors and conspiracy theories by strategically deploying black, gray, or white propaganda.
    4. IRA's propaganda type is predictive of strategic target of IRA campaigns.
Variables or Concepts
  • Independent variables & concepts
    1. Instances of fear mongering
    2. Populist sentiment
    3. Emotional charge
    4. Polarization
    5. Hostility
    6. Conspiracy-theorizing
    7. Incitement to offline action
    8. Propaganda classes or types
  • Dependent variables & concepts
    1. Propaganda classes or types
    2. Campaign targets
Methodologies
  • Quantitative method description
    1. ANOVA method
Time Frame
  • Start: 2012
  • End: 2017