Publication details | Global Responses to Asymmetric Threats

Summary
Analytical Information

Citation

Dixon, Paul. 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 32, no. 3 (June 2009): 353-381. DOI: 10.1080/01402390902928172.

Findings

The study shows that the British approach to COIN is ambiguous and not merely focused on the hearts and minds strategy to achieve success. Specifically, the ambiguity of COIN hearts and minds approach is used to justify the use of hostile methods on local population. Thus, the British army proclaimed to be using hearts and minds approach in order to conceal the level of coercive and repressive methods used in Malaya. Successful counterinsurgency operations sometimes cannot be fought within the law and without high levels of coercion as shown from the Malaya experience. From this perspective the phrase hearts and minds is a useful way of concealing from human rights organizations, media and public opinion the reality that effective counterinsurgency practice is necessarily highly coercive.

While some of the techniques used in Malaya were also employed in Northern Ireland many were not. For example, the population displacement was contemplated but never seriously considered. The British military used less coercive approach in Northern Ireland (in comparison with the Malaya case), but illegitimate and counterproductive force was used which did little to win hearts and minds and contributed to a prolonged conflict. Had government agencies (including military) applied human rights principles during the conflict; those actions could have been used to counter the paramilitary groups' propaganda, undermine their political representatives, thereby reducing the credibility of such groups in the eyes of local residents as well as outside observers. The case of Northern Ireland does not suggest that coercieve measures were helpful; instead the peace process was successful in spite of abuses and violence.

The study also considers the differences in U.S and British COIN approach in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these contexts, it finds that there was disagreement between the British and the American forces over the best COIN strategies to use. The British military felt its hearts and minds approach was undermined by the highly coercive nature of the U.S military action in Iraq. The fragmentation of the Iraqi state led the U.S to consider the conflict there as existential, thus encouraging the use of a conventional approach instead of COIN in the north of Iraq through excessive deployment of force, which led to disastrous outcomes. The British, by contrast, tended towards a traditional approach that emphasized the minimum use of force justified solely on grounds of necessity and a minimum intervention in Iraqi society in the south. Overall, the study shows that dichotomous thinking about coercion vs. hearts and minds prevents the debate on which approaches and in which contexts should be used.

Research Background

Research questions
1. What was the impact of the British Army counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya?
2. What was the impact of the British Army counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland?
3. What are the differences between the British and U.S COIN strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Hypotheses
1. The use of coercive methods plays an important role in the success of COIN operations.
2. The use of hearts and minds approach affects the success of COIN operations.
3. The U.S COIN approach in Iraq and Afghanistan was more focused on the use of force than the British approach.

Variables or Concepts

Independent variables & concepts
1. Use of coercive methods
2. Use of hearts and minds approach
Dependent variables & concepts
1. COIN outcome
2. COIN strategy approach

Methodologies

Qualitative method description
1. Historical case study of British COIN efforts in Malaya using secondary sources
2. Historical case study of British COIN efforts in Northern Ireland using secondary sources
3. Comparative case study between U.S and Britain's COIN strategies and efforts based on secondary sources

Time Frame

Start: 1948
End: 1960